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SUMMARY
This paper suggests an integrated approach to study selection into and conse-
quences of five modes of preferential economic integration agreements (PEIAs):
goods trade agreements (GTAs), services trade agreements (STAs), double taxa-
tion treaties (DTTs), bilateral investment treaties (BITs), and currency unions as
well as currency pegs (CUAs). A detailed descriptive analysis reveals typical inte-
gration patterns, with DTTs and BITs often being first steps towards deeper inte-
gration. We consider the effects of PEIAs on bilateral goods trade, services trade,
and FDI and provide conclusive evidence that single and combined PEIAs are
associated with positive effects not only on single outcome but typically on all out-
comes. Investment liberalization through DTTs and BITs seems to be particu-
larly beneficial since concluding them alone or in any combination with other
agreements encourages goods trade even more than the liberalization of goods trade
per se.
—Peter Egger and Georg Wamser
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1. INTRODUCTION
World War II reset the world economy almost to zero economic integration relative
to how integrated the world was at the beginning of the twentieth century. Many if
not most of the bilateral and multilateral agreements granting preferential access to
foreign markets – through trade in goods and services but also along dimensions
beyond such transactions – were abandoned in its course. Accordingly, multilateral
political and economic cooperation through the General Agreement on Trade and
Tariffs (GATT) in 1947 as well as preferential integration through the formation of
the European Community in 1958 (Treaties of Rome) and the European Free Trade
Association (EFTA) in 1960 happened almost in a vacuum of integration of that kind.
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While the political obstacles to those agreements were big at the time, so were the eco-
nomic merits, given the level of disintegration brought about by the War. At that
point of history, had data on bilateral goods trade been as abundant as nowadays, the
trade gains from preferential liberalization would have been almost directly attribut-
able to the inception of those agreements.
In terms of preferential as well as non-preferential economic integration, the world
has fundamentally changed since. For instance, tariffs have been substantially reduced
within GATT (now the members of the World Trade Organization, WTO) through
seven completed rounds of negotiations mainly about tariffs. Since the completion of
the Uruguay round in 1986, most countries apply single-digit average most-favoured
nation tariff rates negotiated under GATT not only to members of the WTO but even
to non-members. Moreover, since the early 1990s the number of preferential trade
agreements (both under and outside of the auspices of WTO) skyrocketed. As of
November 2011, 313 regional (goods and services) preferential trade agreements noti-
fied to the WTO were in force, with many more being negotiated. While economic
research often focuses on and emphasizes the role of goods trade liberalization, nei-
ther preferential nor multilateral liberalization of goods trade happened in isolation.
The foundation of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) in 1995
paved the way for liberalization of (mostly) trade and commercial presence in services
which saw major steps forward not only in the documentation of the degree of liberal-
ization of service transactions across countries and sectors in 1996 but also in the con-
clusion of preferential agreements about services trade. Also the latter happened
mostly since the 1990s.1
While goods trade agreements (GTAs) and services trade agreements (STAs) were
arguably important for either type of trade, growth of trade has long been outpaced
by the growth of multinational enterprise (MNE) activity over the last three decades
(see Markusen, 1995). Economic theory suggests that multinational activity induces
trade in (headquarters) services which either complements (through vertical multi-
national organization) or substitutes (through horizontal multinational organization)
trade in goods (see Helpman, 1984; Markusen, 1984, 2002; Markusen and Venables,
1998, 2000; Ekholm et al., 2007). Hence, GTAs are a potential driver of goods trade,
and STAs potentially affect services trade, but they may also interact and affect out-
come through the presence of vertical, horizontal, or more complex forms of MNEs.
Two other modes of preferential liberalization directly address and affect the environ-
ment of multinationals in their foreign activity: bilateral investment treaties (BITs)
specifically regulate procedures in the case of expropriation and generally influence
the risk of bilateral investments; and double taxation treaties (DTTs), which aim at
avoiding the double taxation of profits earned abroad (apart from ensuring informa-
1 Of the 313 aforementioned preferential trade agreements notified to the WTO and in force by Novem-
ber 2011, 122 were pure goods trade agreements, 1 was a pure services trade agreement, and 88 were
agreements covering goods and services trade.
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tion exchange between taxing authorities). By virtue of the interdependence of trade
and MNE activity, these agreements may display direct or indirect effects on trade
flows in goods or services. Beyond those four pillars of preferential liberalization, cur-
rency unions in a broad sense (covering currency unions as well as currency pegs;
CUAs) affect economic transactions of any considered kind (trade in goods and ser-
vices as well as MNE activity) through a reduction of exchange rate risk in a quasi-
preferential way.
Both normative and positive work on the one hand, and both theoretical and
empirical work on the other hand has recognized the role of all of these modes of pref-
erential liberalization for long. At the same time, research on these matters of integra-
tion has been conducted in an astonishingly disintegrated way. The analysis of
(mostly) one single mode of economic integration is symptomatic for the majority of
the theoretical as well as empirical work available. While some authors have paid
specific attention to the interaction between some pairs of modes, their interest was
typically of a theoretical nature and related empirical work is not or only scarcely
available. It is common in quantitative work to assume that preferential agreements of
the mentioned kind are concluded independently both across treatments and in time
so that partial inference can inform us about their marginal impact. Hence, the aca-
demic approach in economics and political science to the causes and consequences of
Preferential Economic Integration Agreements (PEIAs) is mainly unimodal in two
ways: it focuses on one type of agreement at a time and, when assessing the con-
sequences, considers only one outcome. The latter is potentially harmful, because we
may misattribute effects on a given outcome to certain agreements or underestimate
effects of agreements at large.
Figure 1 considers preferential economic integration in goods trade agreements
(GTAs), services trade agreements (STAs), double taxation treaties (DTTs), bilateral
investment treaties (BITs), and currency union agreements, including currency pegs
(CUAs) among 210 economies2 and 43,890 dyads (country-pairs) over the time period
1960 to 2005.3 In particular, the figure shows how the number of PEIAs concluded
developed over time for each type of PEIA. It suggests that double taxation treaties
outnumber trade agreements of any kind by far. The figure shows an ever-increasing
number of all types of agreements except currency unions and pegs over the sample
period 1960 to 2005. While currency unions and pegs were the most common form of
2 The list of countries includes self-governing economies (e.g. the Channel Islands) as separate entries.
3 The definition of PEIA variables is as follows. GTAs are customs unions, free trade areas, or what the
WTO refers to as preferential trade agreements covering goods trade issues; the latter being more shallow
than the former ones. The source of information underlying the binary GTA variable is taken from the
WTO and the dataset collected by Egger and Larch (2008). STAs are agreements notified to the WTO
that accord with Article 92 of the GATS (most of them overlapping with GTAs). Information on DTTs
and BITs was collected from the United Nation Conference on Trade and Development’s (UNCTAD’s)
online database on DTTs and BITs. The binary CUA variable was constructed on the basis of the data
on de facto exchange rate arrangements collected by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) and updated based on
information from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
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integration until 1974, this form of integration became less important during the last
decades.4
Figure 1 also demonstrates that the lion’s share of the considered agreements came
into force in the 1990s and thereafter. As such, this does not cast doubt on the uni-
modal approach about PEIAs taken by economists. However, Table 1 illustrates that
the five modes of PEIAs are by no means mutually exclusive.
Table 1 is organized as follows. The rows condition on an observation (i.e. a coun-
try-pair-year unit) to have a specific agreement and the cells infer how big of a per-
centage of the observations had agreements as listed in the columns. For instance,
the cell in the lower right corner, ‘None–None’ indicates that about 92% of all observa-
tions did not have any of the considered agreements in place. Hence, on average
across all years, 8% of the observations had some type of agreement. The cell STA-
GTA in the upper left corner suggests that about 0.6% of all country-pairs operated
under both a services trade agreement and a goods trade agreement in the average
year. Double taxation treaties come relatively frequently in isolation (2.2%), together
with goods trade agreements (0.5%), or together with bilateral investment treaties
(0.6%). Bilateral investment treaties are unlikely to overlap with goods trade agree-
ments and services trade agreements (either of them about 0.1%). The reason for the
latter may be that some goods trade agreements and services trade agreements
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Figure 1. Number of PEIAs 1960–2005
4 Note that over the last years (2003–2005) in the sample, about 10% of the 43,890 country-pairs oper-
ated under double taxation treaties; about a third as many pairs had bilateral investment treaties (com-
pared with double taxation treaties); only about 5–6% of the pairs had goods or services trade agreements
and less than 2% of all pairs had a currency union or a peg.
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reduce the risk of expropriation of foreign investors similar to bilateral investment
treaties so that they substitute for having a bilateral investment treaty (e.g. this is the
case for the European Union).
This paper aims at assessing the fundamental variables determining selection into
the five modes of economic integration in the panel dataset based on 46 years, 210
economies, and 43,890 dyads (country-pairs) underlying Table 1. Selection in five
modes of mutually non-exclusive PEIAs spans a possible set of 25 = 32 mutually exclusive
preferential treatment configurations. Of those 32 configurations, only 26 are actually
used among the 210 economies between 1960 and 2005. We use multivariate nonlin-
ear probability models to estimate probabilities for the mutually exclusive treatment
combinations used by country-pairs. Based on these probabilities and an approach of
selection on observables to reduce the self-selection bias of country-pairs into
treatments through matching, we assess effects of PEIA configurations on six different
outcome variables: the probability of positive bilateral goods trade, the level of bilateral
goods trade, the probability of positive bilateral services trade, the level of bilateral
services trade, the probability of positive bilateral FDI, and the level of bilateral FDI.5
We first estimate long-run responses of outcome to selection into different treatments
as of the year 2005. Considering causal effects of treatment on outcomes in that year
corresponds to a long-run analysis, since we do not require outcome to respond to
treatment within a certain (short) time span, but the response may have taken years if
not decades. In a second step, we isolate typical patterns of integration paths found in
the data. For instance, there is to date only a small number of country-pairs which
Table 1. A snapshot of PEIA overlap
Countries with/and GTA STA DTT BIT CUA None
GTA . . . . .
STA 0.006 . . . .
DTT 0.005 0.004 . . .
BIT 0.001 0.001 0.006 . .
CUA 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.0003 .
None 0.015 0.009 0.022 0.003 0.015 0.921
Notes: 2,018,940 observations, 43,890 country-pairs, 1960–2005. Values reflect average frequencies as fractions of
all observations with PEIA (row) and PEIA (column). GTAs are Goods Trade Agreements; STAs are Services
Trade Agreements; DTTs are Double Taxation Treaties; BITs are Bilateral Investment Treaties; and CUAs are
Currency Union Agreements which include unions with one currency as well as currency pegs.
5 The effects we estimate should be thought of as direct effects, not accounting for general equilibrium
repercussions. Appendix B indicates how those direct treatment effects relate to total effects in general equi-
librium, and it illustrates why, on average, the two are quite similar. The direct effects of PEIAs estimated
here consist of two components, an immediate effect and a mediated effect on outcome. For instance, GTAs on
the one hand reduce tariffs (the immediate effect) but on the other hand often induce institutional changes
which go beyond mere trade policy but may influence trade (the mediated effect). This has to do with what
Richard Baldwin (2011) calls 21st-century regionalism where trade preferentialism is used to determine
rules (about competition, the environment, services, labour standards, etc.) which may have indirect effects
on trade.
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liberalize services trade without making goods trade provisions. In general, there is a
tendency to liberalize goods trade first and services trade in the aftermath. It is less
clear as to when countries liberalize foreign direct investment through bilateral invest-
ment treaties and double taxation treaties relative to the implementation of goods
trade agreements and services trade agreements. We may contrast archetypal integra-
tion paths in terms of their effects on outcome with alternative integration paths. This
may inform us about preferable integration paths on average, at least among a subset of
alternatives. We may ask the question how PEIA switching affects outcome relative to
non-switching within reasonable time windows by conditioning on the same PEIA
treatment configurations for switching and non-switching country-pairs. The latter
approach delivers insights into the magnitude of short-run versus medium-run
responses to the inception of PEIAs and the speed of adjustment of outcomes towards
a new counterfactual equilibrium.
Compared to the existing literature, this analysis covers a number of novel features
including the consideration of multiple PEIA treatments, of multiple outcomes, of
the extensive versus the intensive country margin of these outcomes, and dynamic
adjustments of those margins. In particular, the paper has two goals. First, to indicate
which initial integration strategy average country-pairs should adopt when having maxim-
ization of a specific outcome in mind. Second, to reveal which integration path country-
pairs eventually should pursue with such an objective in mind. The latter also relates to
both the sequence and the number of types of PEIAs country-pairs should implement.
In the next section, we proceed with an eclectic overview of the literatures on indi-
vidual types of PEIAs as considered here. This helps us formulating reduced-form
models which portray the net gains for countries from selecting into one of the five
PEIAs and combinations thereof. Section 3 dissects data on PEIA treatments. Sec-
tion 4 alludes to the econometric approach adopted in this paper to reduce the poten-
tial self-selection bias associated with PEIA treatments on cross-border aggregate
economic activity. Section 5 describes the data sources not only for PEIAs and
outcomes but also for their determinants. Section 6 presents estimation results of the
multivariate selection models along with estimates of the impact of treatments on
outcomes. The last section concludes with a summary of the main findings.
2. AN ECLECTIC LITERATURE REVIEW
For reasons of brevity, let us focus on PEIAs which intend to raise welfare through a
stimulus of trade or foreign direct investment. From a general viewpoint, theoretical
models about the (local or global) welfare effects of PEIAs suggest that they are larger
if the effects of PEIAs on targeted outcome (trade with trade-related agreements and
foreign direct investment with investment-related ones) are larger and undesired side
effects (diversion of trade or investment) are smaller. Under which economic circum-
stances this is the case depends on the fundamental reasons for trade or investment:
differences in relative factor endowments in Heckscher–Ohlin-type models; differ-
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ences in technology in Ricardian models; total and relative country size, trade and
investment costs, as well as price mark-ups over marginal costs in new trade theory
models; market structure and elasticity of demand, market size, and trade and invest-
ment costs in oligopoly and other variable-price-elasticity-of-demand models of trade
and investment.6 In all such models, the feasibility of agreements depends on whether
compensating transfers among the parties negotiating about an agreement are possi-
ble or not.
Most of the empirical literature on PEIAs builds on static new trade theory models
of national or multinational firm activity (such as trade or foreign direct investment,
FDI). The reason for this is that new trade theory models suggest gravity-type models
of bilateral gross flows of trade or investment for which there appears to be over-
whelming support by the data: the bilateral volume of trade and investment can be
explained with great success by employing exporter plus importer country size (in
terms of GDP) and exporter-to-importer relative country size along with measures of
trade and investment costs (with alternative functional forms of using country size
variables). Relative factor endowment differences or technology differences seem
much less important in relative terms. Since the theory of PEIAs suggests that the
same fundamentals that determine trade and FDI should determine the welfare
effects of PEIAs (such as GTAs, STAs, BITs or DTTs), larger, similarly sized coun-
tries with higher trade or investment costs before, and smaller trade and investment
costs after concluding a PEIA, should be more inclined towards participating than
others. While there are further aspects important for the formation of CUAs, relating
to price volatility and economic stability, essentially the same determinants motivat-
ing GTAs or STAs as well as BITs or DTTs also describe the features of an optimal
currency area, so that they apply for tying currencies, too (see Dorn and Egger,
2011). Prototypes of new trade theory based work on the determinants and con-
sequences of trade-related PEIAs which find support of the just-mentioned relation-
ships for goods trade are Baier and Bergstrand (2004, 2007, 2009) and Magee
(2003). In essence, these authors find that larger, more similarly sized countries with
lower trade costs in the absence of political barriers to trade conclude trade-related
PEIAs (mostly GTAs) more likely, and that such agreements have the intended stim-
ulating effect on trade. While, at this point, there is less systematic evidence about
the causes and consequences of STAs, it seems that liberalization of services trade is
driven by the same factors and in a similar way as goods trade liberalization (see
Egger and Lanz, 2008; Francois and Hoekman, 2010).
There is evidence at both the aggregate level of investment (see Egger and Pfaffer-
mayr, 2004) as well as the firm level (see Egger and Merlo, 2012) that BITs encourage
6 There is another important strand of work which relates to the role of political economy factors for pro-
tection. However, we will not touch upon this topic since measurement of the fundamentals for a large
cross-section of countries is difficult (see Arcand et al., 2010, for political economy determinants of trade
agreements).
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FDI. More importantly, in our context, new trade theory based empirical work on the
causes of BITs suggests that they, akin to trade agreements, are concluded among
partners which should display larger volumes of bilateral FDI in the absence of polit-
ical or risk-related barriers to MNE activity. For instance, Bergstrand and Egger
(2011) find that country size as well as trade and investment costs are the key drivers
of the conclusion of (GTAs and) BITs. As with GTAs only, there is some role to play
for relative factor endowment differences but the propensity of concluding a GTA, a
BIT, or both, for any country-pair, is largely dominated by economic size of the integ-
rating market and by barriers to trade and investment.
The consequences of DTTs are less clear-cut for an obvious reason: on the one
hand, DTTs aim at avoiding discriminatory (e.g. between exporting and multinational
firms) double taxation of foreign-earned profits, which, ceteris paribus, should stimulate
FDI; on the other hand, DTTs aim at greater transparency about domestic and for-
eign tax bases of national investors and intend to close loopholes in profit taxation and to
reduce opportunities of tax fraud of international investors. This means that, from an
investor’s perspective, the net stimulus on FDI is unclear (see Blonigen and Davies, 2004).
But it is still the case that DTTs are concluded more likely among such countries where
bilateral FDI should be large according to new trade theory and, ceteris paribus, they tend
to cause bigger volumes of bilateral FDI on average (see Egger et al., 2006).
Finally, there is broad evidence of a positive effect of tighter currency alignments for
both trade (see Rose, 2000; Glick and Rose, 2002; Egger, 2008) and investment (see
Goldberg and Kolstad, 1995). Countries tend to self-select into currency unions and
pegs systematically, broadly in line with optimum currency area criteria (see Persson,
2001; Barro and Tenreyro, 2007). In new trade theorymodels, the latter are largely con-
sistent with factors determining greater flows of goods, services and, eventually, factors
(such as investment). Thus, on average, we should find CUAs being concluded more
likely among large, similarly sized countries with smaller trade (and investment) costs.
This brief overview suggests that new trade theory fundamentals matter for both
trade and MNE activity such as FDI and, hence, they determine preferential integ-
ration through GTAs, STAs, BITs, DTTs, and even CUAs. Yet, while the same fun-
damentals appear to be drivers of all such PEIAs, empirical research on their causes
and consequences did not strive for an integrated approach in their analysis so far.
Implicitly, it has been assumed that such agreements are concluded independently of
each other and that they do not influence each other’s impact in determining out-
come. We provide evidence for a tremendous overlap in the conclusion of different
types of PEIAs which suggests that changes in outcome can not be trivially ascribed to
one or the other type of agreement. Moreover, not only do bilateral goods trade, ser-
vices trade, and FDI tend to be largest for the same countries, a significant part of
trade of all kinds is even conducted directly by multinational firms. Thus, focusing on
effects of GTAs on goods trade alone or of BITs and DTTs on FDI alone will likely
miss out important effects on other international economic outcomes. This calls for an
integrated approach to consider effects of PEIAs on outcome(s).
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3. SOME FACTS ABOUT PEIA MEMBERSHIP
While Figure 1 and Table 1 shed some light on the frequency of PEIAs and the over-
lap of alternative modes thereof, deeper insights can be gained from a more systematic
descriptive analysis. For instance, when taking the yearly numbers on PEIAs pre-
sented in Figure 1 relative to the total number of country-pairs per year (43,890), we
may obtain the probability of a randomly drawn country-pair to be engaged in one or
the other agreement. Table 1 indicates the probability of a randomly drawn pair to
combine one type of PEIA with another one. However, this does neither allow conclu-
sions about typical multi-modal or single-modal PEIAs in the data nor does it provide
insights into typical integration paths of country-pairs. We shed light on these matters
in this section.
Consider the aforementioned five modes of PEIAs (GTAs, STAs, DTTs, BITs, and
CUAs) and let us focus on the frequency of such agreements of the 210 countries with
the other 209 countries (i.e. of 43,890 country-pairs) over the period 1960–2005.7
Throughout the paper, we use binary indicators for DTTs, BITs, GTAs, and STAs
which are unity whenever a given agreement was signed – in or prior to a respective
year (e.g. as notified to the WTO).8 Altogether, the dataset considered includes
2,018,940 country-pair-year data points. Obviously, since PEIAs of the considered
type are symmetric, one could drop half of the observations without any loss of
insight. However, we will keep all observations for the ease of data handling when
estimating consequences of PEIAs later on.9 Table 2 presents all 25 = 32 PEIA-com-
binations countries might principally use, and it accumulates observations across all
years in the sample. For better illustration, we sort combinations by their frequency in
the data.
7 While we cover five modes of PEIAs here, one could think of both deepening and broadening even this
large set. For instance, differentiating between trade agreements – say, customs unions, free trade areas,
and partial scope agreements as notified to the WTO – rather than subsuming all of those agreements
under the heading of GTAs may be useful. Alternatively, one could distinguish between deep and shallow
GTAs as in Horn et al. (2010). We could refer to such approaches as ones of deepening the notion of
GTAs. For instance, in an earlier draft of this manuscript, we used deep versus shallow GTAs rather than
a single type (results are available from the authors upon request). Moreover, one could pursue a broader
approach by covering also other agreements such as ones on competition, environmental standards, or
labour standards. Any one of those alternatives would lead to a non-trivial increase in the number of treat-
ments, with increased problems for precise estimation. Hence, we focus on the proposed catalogue of PE-
IAs which is already much bigger than the ones considered in previous research.
8 At least for DTTs and BITs, it turns out that investment effects occur prior to the date these treaties
come into force, and that these effects are large relative to the entry-into-force effects. With such anticipa-
tion effects, the total treatment effect would be downward biased (in labour economics, this is referred to
as Ashenfelter’s dip) when focusing on entry-into-force effects. Similarly, many trade agreements involve
phase-in adjustments of tariffs or institutions prior to the agreement itself coming into effect. Clearly, it is a
judgment call which one of the two to focus on, but we felt more comfortable with using PEIA signatures
in quantifying effects of PEIAs (rather than ratifications).
9 One might be worried about a deflation of standard errors in the PEIA selection models, but those could
easily be adjusted ex post, if desired. In any case, while the treatments considered and the treatment effects
estimated are symmetric between pair ij and pair ji in any given year, the outcomes for those two pairs are
not the same.
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The figures in Table 2 can be interpreted as follows. First, of the 32 possible com-
binations of PEIAs, only 26 actually appear in the data. Of all the combinations possi-
ble, the no-PEIA scenario in the top row is used most frequently (notice that this is
largely due to a small number of PEIAs in the early decades of the sample period).
When drawing observations randomly from the data, there would be a chance of
100 9 1,859,225/2,018,940  92% to draw a unit where no facilitated market access
of any considered kind is granted to firms in two countries vis-a-vis each other. Notice
that only in 60 cases country-pairs in the data use every type of PEIA mode possible.
There are numerous reasons for why this is the case. For instance, some GTAs and
STAs include investment provisions which render regulations usually formulated in
Table 2. Being in, switching into, and switching out of PEIAs
PEIA treatments
Observations (total) Switchers into Switchers out ofBIT STA DTT BIT CUA
0 0 0 0 0 1,859,225 2,405 8,536
0 0 1 0 0 44,820 3,165 1,055
0 0 0 0 1 30,041 1,055 2,354
1 0 0 0 0 29,549 2,021 773
0 1 0 0 0 17,961 1,379 163
0 0 1 1 0 9,990 990 273
0 0 0 1 0 5,721 739 488
1 1 0 0 0 4,833 462 161
1 0 1 0 0 4,005 510 98
1 1 1 0 0 3,696 489 122
0 0 1 0 1 1,903 189 169
1 1 1 0 1 1,482 185 13
1 0 0 0 1 1,087 56 58
0 1 1 0 0 888 105 35
1 1 1 1 0 732 217 4
1 0 1 1 0 725 138 34
0 0 1 1 1 484 76 10
1 1 0 0 1 393 46 40
0 1 0 1 0 354 50 12
1 0 0 1 0 327 56 28
0 1 1 1 0 248 33 5
1 1 0 1 0 241 61 19
0 0 0 1 1 158 28 9
1 1 1 1 1 60 4 0
0 1 0 0 1 16 2 2
1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1
0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0
0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0
2,018,940 14,462 14,462
Notes: GTAs are Goods Trade Agreements; STAs are Services Trade Agreements; DTTs are Double Taxation
Treaties; BITs are Bilateral Investment Treaties; and CUAs are Currency Union Agreements which include
unions with one currency as well as currency pegs.
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BITs obsolete (e.g. the European Union). Some countries adopt unilateral tax exemp-
tion for foreign-earned incomes so that concluding DTTs for reasons of double taxa-
tion relief becomes an idle strategy. Among the considered PEIAs, DTTs, CUAs,
GTAs, and GTAs in combination with STAs are frequently used. Moreover, DTTs
are often combined with BITs. Also, GTAs and STAs are frequently combined with
DTTs. One of the five PEIAs is chosen in about 6% of the cases, two types of PEIAs
are selected in about 1% of the cases, and three or four modes are combined in less
than 1% of the cases.
The table also provides information about switching into and out of such integ-
ration strategies in the two columns on the outer right. For instance, the table sug-
gests that in 2,405 cases a country-pair gave up on some form of facilitated market
access vis-a-vis each other and did not have any PEIA afterwards. Most frequently
pairs adopted DTTs – either DTTs only or some combination with other PEIAs (in
particular, with BITs). In 3,165 cases country-pairs switched into a combination with
just a DTT; 739 of the included pairs adopted BITs without any other PEIA. Over
the observation period, 2,021 pairs adopted GTAs alone, 1,379 pairs STAs alone,
and 1,055 units adopted some form of CUA without any other PEIA. Moreover,
country-pairs most frequently gave up on CUAs alone and switched into some other
form of PEIAs. Countries also abandoned a situation with only a DTT or only a
GTA quite frequently relative to other forms of PEIAs. Hence, while country-pairs
often concluded CUAs or DTTs alone, they also frequently switched out of such
PEIAs.
While Table 2 sheds light on the frequency of switching into and out of PEIAs, it
provides not much insight into transitions between states of preferential integration.
For the five modes of PEIAs (as in Table 2), typical transitions between 1960 and
2005 are identified in Table 3. The table includes the treatments country-pairs may
switch out of in rows and treatment states country-pairs may adopt in the columns.
Notice that we suppress the information about stayers in this transition matrix and
focus on changes of treatment status (due to space constraints, we also suppress all
combinations which have not been left once, i.e. lines including zeros only). The
top row of Table 3 reveals that – consistent with the top row of Table 2 – many
country-pairs leave the state of having no PEIA whatsoever. From that state, coun-
try-pairs switch particularly often into one with DTTs only, but they also frequently
switch into CUAs only, STAs only, or BITs only. Notice that the sum of all entries
from the first rows of the upper and lower panels of Table 3 corresponds to the
number of switchers out of the no-PEIA treatment in the first row and last column
of Table 2. Moreover, the sum of all cells in the first column of the upper panel in
Table 3 corresponds to the number of switchers into the no-PEIA treatment in the
first row and penultimate column of Table 2, etc. Table 3 allows us to identify typ-
ical integration paths. For example, when country-pairs have a DTT (BIT), the next
typical step is to conclude a BIT (DTT). In total, 291 country-pairs with a GTA
only concluded a DTT in a next step. Out of a situation with a DTT only, 277
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country-pairs concluded a GTA in conjunction with an STA in a next integration
step.
Although Table 3 already reveals interesting integration patterns, one may provide
even deeper insights into typical paths of integration since 1960. Table 4 summarizes
PEIA data for country-pairs which have switched more than once. The top panel of
Table 4 shows that if country-pairs switched twice over the whole time-span 1960–
2005, they typically did so from a situation without any PEIA into one with a BIT or
a DTT to one with both a DTT and a BIT. Of course, the latter is consistent with
and could be read off Table 3 with some effort. From 1960 to 2005, this happened in
481 (260 + 221) cases. The other panels of Table 4 reveal that in many cases a DTT
or a BIT was just the first step towards deeper integration, where, starting from no
agreement, up to four integration agreements have been concluded (e.g. in 84 cases
with 3 switches).
Table 3 and Table 4 do not only reveal typical patterns of integration paths since
1960, they also indicate that causal inference of treatment effects in a dynamic
Table 4. Dynamic behaviour (2–4 switches, most frequent cases)
2 switches
Cases Initial Switch 1 Switch 2
338 00000 00001 00000
287 00000 00010 00110
260 00000 00100 00110
221 00000 10000 00000
215 00000 10000 10100
162 00000 00100 11100
142 00001 00000 00100
133 00000 00100 10100
124 00000 10000 11000
3 switches
Cases Initial Switch 1 Switch 2 Switch 3
84 00000 00100 00110 11110
75 00001 00000 00001 00000
43 00000 00100 11100 11101
43 00000 00010 00110 11110
36 00000 00100 00110 10110
27 00000 00001 00000 01000
25 00000 10000 10100 11100
25 00000 00010 00110 00111
24 00000 10000 11000 11100
4 switches
Cases Initial Switch 1 Switch 2 Switch 3 Switch 4
20 00000 00001 00000 00001 00000
12 00001 00000 00001 10001 10000
8 00000 10000 10100 11100 11110
8 00000 10000 11000 11010 11110
Notes: 5-digit codes correspond to the following PEIA modes: GTA, STA, DTT, BIT, CUA; GTAs are Goods
Trade Agreements; STAs are Services Trade Agreements; DTTs are Double Taxation Treaties; BITs are Bilat-
eral Investment Treaties; and CUAs are Currency Union Agreements which include unions with one currency as
well as currency pegs. Cases denotes the number of country-pairs exhibiting a particular integration pattern.
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analysis is difficult due to small numbers of cases for most transitions.10 Conversely,
we should be aware that estimated effects of individual PEIAs estimated in the past
quite likely attributed effects to a single mode where in fact they accrued to a mix (or
an integration path) of policies.
4. MULTIPLE TREATMENT EFFECTS OF PEIAS
This paper utilizes propensity score matching to reduce (if not avoid) the self-selection
bias of country-pairs into multiple treatments associated with combinations of PEIA
modes. We outline technical details and the assumptions in more formal terms in
Appendix A. However, it is useful to briefly justify the choice of the approach here. In
general terms, propensity score matching aims at eliminating the treatment effect bias
from self-selection of cross-sectional units (such as individuals, firms, regions, countries)
into some treatments. The approach is most commonly applied in labour economics
and development economics to study the effects of specific programs (as binary treat-
ments) on individuals or firms at the micro level. Matching invokes the
so-called conditional independence assumption where unconditional mean independ-
ence does not hold. Whenever units self-select into a treatment, the unconditional com-
parison of average outcome for the treated and the untreated should not be interpreted
as or is a biased estimate of the true treatment effect. Invoking conditional mean inde-
pendence through matching implies that we can find a set of observable factors on
which we can condition on non-parametrically, so that after conditioning, the self-
selection bias is drastically reduced (and ideally avoided). Technically, this is done by
estimating the propensity (probability) of receiving the treatment and to select only
those treated and untreated units for which comparable propensities (or propensity
scores) are found. Then, consistent treatment effects can be estimated from differences
between the outcomes of, in this sense, comparable treated and untreated observations.
In non-technical terms, two key assumptions for this to work are the following. First,
there should be a sufficient overlap in the estimated propensities of the treated and con-
trol units so that enough comparable units are available. Second, for similar propensity
scores to reflect true similarity between treated and untreated control units, it should be
the case that the determinants (observables) underlying the propensity score are similar,
too. Otherwise, similarity in propensity scores would be an artifact and the propensity
score metric should not be used as a compact metric to establish similarity.11
With numerous individuals or firms, these assumptions are often met. However,
propensity score matching is also used with aggregate data. Examples in international
10 If anything, a finer distinction of alternative forms of agreements would only exacerbate that problem.
11 With all treatment effects estimated in this study, we do not only select comparable units in terms of
the propensity score into the control group but also condition on observables as suggested by Blundell and
Costa Dias (2009). This eliminates all differences in the first moment of any one of the observables
between the control group and the treatment group.
PREFERENTIAL MARKET ACCESS 159
economics are Egger et al. (2008) or Baier and Bergstrand (2009), who first used pro-
pensity score matching to establish conditional mean independence in trade outcomes
(volume or intra-industry trade shares) at the country-pair level. It turns out that even
at this level, there is much randomness. For instance, numerous agreements are
planned but are never signed for random political, economic, or other reasons. In the
time dimension, even more agreements are planned but are not ultimately signed at
planned dates. Some agreements are high up at the agenda of one government, but the
incumbents lose in subsequent elections, and signing the agreement has low priority
with the successor government, etc. All such issues surface in the fact that propensity
scores of individual PEIA modes as well as the multiple PEIA modes are determined
well but not perfectly by economic, geographical and political fundamentals. In particu-
lar, the degree of randomness is non-trivial with as many as 32 possible (and 26 actually
used) treatments as underlying this study on the effects of self-selected PEIA modes.12
5. DATA
In the context of our analysis, we may distinguish three sets of data: ones underlying
the binary indicator variables for PEIA status, observable variables determining multi-
nomial PEIA status, and ones for outcomes that we expect PEIAs to affect.
5.1. Data on PEIA status
We collect data on PEIA status from three sources. First, information about GTAs
and STAs stems mainly from the WTO’s online database. We augment this informa-
tion by one about GTAs that have not been notified to the WTO but are included in
the datasets of Bergstrand et al. (2010). Second, we use information about DTTs and
BITs as made available by the UNCTAD online database. Finally, we use the data
provided by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) to classify (de facto) currency unions and
currency pegs. Since their dataset ends in 2001, we extend it to subsequent years until
2005, using information from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
5.2. Data on determinants of PEIAs
Our empirical specification of the determinants of PEIAs is similar to the one in Baier
and Bergstrand (2004). As mentioned in Section 2, theoretical models of trade and
investment liberalization suggest that the same determinants affecting trade also affect
foreign direct investment in general equilibrium, and so the same determinants driving
12 Alternatives to the propensity score matching approach would be difference-in-difference analysis,
switching regression, or instrumental variable regression. However, the results in Baier and Bergstrand
(2007) and Egger et al. (2008) suggest that these alternative methods – though being based on different sets
of assumptions (see Wooldridge, 2002) – typically lead to similar results, at least when applied with aggreg-
ate country-pair data in international economics.
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preferential trade liberalization also drive investment liberalization (see Egger et al., 2006,
2007a, 2007b; or Bergstrand and Egger, 2011).13 Of course, this does not mean that dif-
ferent types of liberalization are adopted at identical configurations of fundamental
observables, but that they depend on the same determinants. The observable variables
determining selection into different modes of PEIAs in our model are the following.
5.2.1. Size and factor endowments. We first define GDPijt ≡ (GDPit + GDPjt),
where GDPit is country i’s real GDP in year t and GDPjt country j’s real GDP in t (in
US dollars of the year 2000). Then, the variable SumGDPijt is defined as lnGDPijt for
the country-pair ij. According to new trade theory, both trade and foreign direct
investment are ceteris paribus larger among larger countries and so should be the wel-
fare effects of preferential trade and/or investment liberalization. Real GDP figures
are taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. SimGDPijt is defined
as ln[1(GDPit/GDPijt)2(GDPjt/GDPijt)2] and measures two countries’ similarity in
GDP. Ceteris paribus, this variable is supposed to influence a country-pair’s propensity
to preferentially integrate positively. SumPOPijt is defined analogous to SumGDPijt,
except that we use population numbers POPit and POPjt instead of GDPit and GDPjt,
respectively. This variable is not included in previous specifications (see Baier and
Bergstrand, 2004), but it seems advisable to use it along with SumGDPijt if countries
differ starkly in terms of their productivity. Population figures are also taken from the
World Bank’s World Development Indicators. SimPOPijt is constructed akin to
SimGDPijt and included for the same reason as SumPOPijt. DKLijt captures the difference
in two countries’ relative factor endowments, and is measured as the absolute differ-
ence in the logarithm of two countries’ real GDP per capita (see Egger and Larch,
2008), |ln(GDPit/POPit)ln(GDPjt/POPjt)|. While differences in real per-capita income
are an imperfect measure of differences in capital–labour ratios, it is a stylized fact that
these measures are highly correlated. Since per-capita income is available for many
more countries and much longer time spans than (investment and) capital stock data
are, we base DKLijt on per-capita income rather than capital–labour ratios which
would have to be constructed by the perpetual inventory method under numerous
assumptions. In models in the vein of Helpman and Krugman (1985) with trade but
an absence of multinational firms, trade unambiguously increases with DKLijt as long
as factor price equalization prevails. However, in the presence of multinational firms
and if factor price equalization does not apply, DKLijt still matters for outcome (and
the welfare effects of preferential trade and investment liberalization), but its impact is
ambiguous (see Bergstrand and Egger, 2007). DKL2ijt is the squared value of DKLijt
which is included since the impact of DKLijt on trade, investment, and the welfare
effects of PEIAs is inherently non-linear.
13 In principle, one could include factors such as volatility of real GDP or inflation as determinants of
CUAs. We have done so in an extension but the results about estimated propensities are relatively insens-
itive to that modification.
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5.2.2. Geography. Distanceij is the natural logarithm of the geographical (great circle)
distance between two countries’ economic centres. We use the distance variable pro-
vided by the Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales (CEPII).
Common Borderij is an indicator variable which is unity whenever two countries share a
common land border. The variable is taken from CEPII’s geographical database too.
Common Languageij is an indicator variable which is unity whenever two countries share
a common (official and other) language. Same Continentij is an indicator variable which
is unity whenever two countries are located (at least partly) on the same continent.
The latter two variables are constructed on the basis of publicly available data from
CEPII. WTO Memberijt (one) is a variable which is unity whenever only one country in
a pair is a member of the GATT or the WTO in year t. WTO Memberijt (both) is a vari-
able which is unity whenever both countries in a pair are members of the GATT or
the WTO in year t (see Egger and Nelson, 2010). Landlockedij (one) is an indicator vari-
able which is unity whenever one of two countries exhibits maritime access. Landlockedij
(both) is an indicator variable which is unity whenever neither one of two countries
exhibits maritime access. The latter two variables are taken from CEPII’s geograph-
ical database.
5.2.3. Politics. CDWijt is a variable which counts the number of days two countries
exhibited armed conflict with each other since after World War II. The data are taken
from the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ Armed Conflict Database. In
general, we expect long-lasting armed conflicts to destroy trust and contract viability
among business partners from two countries. In this sense, war destroys the basis for
trade and, hence, the basis for preferential economic integration. DYWijt counts the
number of years since when two countries had the last armed conflict classified as a
war with each other. If two countries never had a war, the variable is set to a maximum
value of 2005. The data are also taken from the International Institute for Strategic
Studies’ Armed Conflict Database. We expect the destructive effects of war in trade
and foreign direct investment as well as the propensity of preferential integration to be
ceteris paribus larger for countries which had a recent conflict with each other. DRDijt
counts the absolute difference in the number of years two countries’ political regimes
are in office. The data are taken from Marshall and Jaggers’ Polity IV database. Polit-
ical scientists have found that longer regime durability and, thus, a more stable envi-
ronment, is prolific to trade so that we expect it to have a positive impact on preferential
economic integration. DPFijt measures the absolute difference in the Polity2 index, which
is larger if a country’s political freedom is greater. Ceteris paribus, we observe that eco-
nomic activity is larger in countries which display a greater political freedom.
5.2.4. Third-country variables. Remoteijt measures the average distance of two coun-
tries i and j from all other countries in the sample in a given year t. Defining the great
circle distance between countries i and j by Dij, Remoteijt is defined as 0,5
ln
P
i 6¼j Dij=ðNt  1Þ
h i
þ ln Pj 6¼i Dij=ðNt  1Þ
h in o
(see Baier and Bergstrand, 2004;
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Egger and Larch, 2008), where Nt is the number of countries in the sample as of year
t. Remoteijt varies over time since the sample of countries which are politically inde-
pendent varies over time. Ceteris paribus, a greater remoteness of a pair of countries
increases the importance of the two for each other so that we would expect it to dis-
play a positive impact on the propensity to grant each other preferential economic
market access. DRKLijt measures the average difference in relative factor endowments
of pair ij together with all other countries in the sample in a given year t. Akin to
DKLijt, it is based on the absolute log difference in real per-capita incomes. Finally, to
capture general equilibrium effects, we include the share of each type of PEIA in t1
relative to the total number of observations. To be precise, we define WGTAijt1 ¼PN
ijt1 GTAijt1  GTAijt1=ðN  1Þ (accordingly, WSTAijt1, WDTTijt1, WBITijt1,
andWCUAijt1).
Standard descriptive statistics of the mentioned observables are provided in
Table 5. While we will not engage in calculating and interpreting marginal effects of
the observables in the multivariate probit models for the sake of brevity, information
about the means and standard deviation of the included fundamentals of PEIA mem-
bership will help the interested reader to compare the magnitudes of standardized
coefficients relative to each other.
5.3. Data on outcomes
We consider effects of PEIA-related treatments as summarized in Table 2 on two
margins each of three outcome variables: nominal bilateral exports of goods in US
dollars, nominal bilateral exports of services in US dollars, and nominal stocks of bilat-
eral foreign direct investment. The two margins considered are the intensive bilateral
(country) margin of activity, where we transform each of the three variables logarith-
mically and only focus on log (i.e. approximately percentage) changes in outcome,
and the extensive bilateral (country) margin of activity, where we focus on changes in the
propensity to trade or invest directly at the country-pair level.14 Bilateral goods exports
panel data for 137 countries and 46 years are from the United Nations’ Comtrade Data-
base, bilateral services export panel data for 129 countries and 14 years are from Francois
et al. (2009), and panel data on bilateral stocks of outward FDI among 137 countries in
36 years are taken from UNCTAD’s Foreign Direct Investment Database.
Table 6 provides some basic descriptive statistics for all considered outcomes and
margins of activity. Since services trade and FDI data are only available for fewer
countries (country-pairs) and years than goods trade is, the number of observations
covered for those two outcomes is smaller than for goods trade.15 While almost 54%
14 The results in Egger et al. (2011) suggest that these two margins (at least for goods trade) can be ana-
lysed as two separate parts of an integrated model.
15 Notice that we eliminate all countries and years from the data which do not report any outcome to or
from any country in a given year. Hence, only countries that are potential sources or recipients of outcome
are included.
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of the country-pairs display positive goods exports in the suitable subset of observa-
tions, FDI stocks are positive in only slightly more than 23%. Services trade is positive
in about 73% of the suitable subsample of observations.
Figure 2 summarizes the average probability of positive goods exports (upper left
panel), services exports (central left panel), and stocks of outward FDI (lower left
Table 5. Descriptive statistics for determinants of PEIA membership
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
SumGDPijt 11.322 1.562 5.805 16.563
SimGDPijt 1.178 1.477 9.385 0.693
SumPOPijt 10.731 1.54 5.063 16.563
SimPOPijt 0.938 1.238 8.819 0.693
DKLijt 1.236 0.886 7.37E-06 4.619
DKL2ijt 2.313 2.846 5.43E-11 21.333
Remoteij 8.707 0.329 6.37 9.704
DRKLijt 1.031 0.484 0.002 3.006
log Distanceij 8.695 0.758 4.088 9.894
Common Borderij 0.025 0.155 0 1
Common Languageij 0.152 0.359 0 1
Same Continentij 0.256 0.437 0 1
WTO Memberijt (one) 0.455 0.498 0 1
WTO Memberijt (both) 0.382 0.486 0 1
Landlockedij (one) 0.301 0.459 0 1
Landlockedij (both) 0.034 0.18 0 1
CDWijt 13.964 304.672 0 15,389
DYWijt 1996.139 131.258 4 2,005
DRDijt 23.441 24.129 0 101
DPFijt 7.798 6.536 0 76
WGTAijt-1 0.042 0.027 0.004 0.107
WSTAijt-1 0.03 0.033 0.001 0.095
WDTTijt-1 0.064 0.048 0.005 0.171
WBITijt-1 0.02 0.023 1.00E-04 0.067
WCUAijt-1 0.033 0.022 0.012 0.075
Notes: 641,620 observations; 137 countriesi; 137 countriesj.
Table 6. Descriptive statistics for outcome variables
Mean Std. Dev. Observations
Goods trade 0.68 3.343 548,713
P(goods trade>0) 0.54 0.498 1,015,498
Services trade 3.507 2.487 23,568
P(services trade>0) 0.728 0.444 32,342
FDI stocks 3.272 3.431 49,590
P(FDI stocks>0) 0.234 0.423 211,680
Notes: All years and available country-pairs. Observations differ across outcomes due to the availability of goods
trade (from United Nations’ World Trade Database), services trade (from OECD’s Online Services Trade Data-
base), and stocks of foreign direct investment (from UNCTAD’s Foreign Direct Investment Statistics Online
Database). Goods trade, services trade, and FDI stocks are defined in logs.
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panel), as well as the average level (in logs) of positive outcomes (the respective panels
on the right-hand side). Using the same logic as in Table 1, the order of the bars in
the panels corresponds to: None, GTA, STA, DTT, BIT, CUA; and combinations
thereof: GTA-STA, GTA-DTT, GTA-BIT, GTA-CUA, STA-DTT, STA-BIT, STA-CUA,
DTT-BIT, DTT-CUA, and BIT-CUA.
The figure suggests, for example, that positive goods trade flows (in logs) with a
GTA (and no other PEIA) exceed goods trade flows (in logs) among countries
without any PEIA (the outcome taking value 1.329 for GTA compared with 0.090
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Figure 2. Outcomes inside and outside of PEIAs
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for None). In fact, bilateral goods exports are lowest when no PEIA was concluded
at all. However, positive goods exports tend to be greater with DTTs or BITs
alone than with GTAs alone. Similarly, the probability of positive exports is lowest
without any PEIA as compared to any alternative with one or more PEIAs. More-
over, multimodal PEIA policies are associated with higher goods exports levels
and higher probabilities of positive goods exports than unimodal ones (to see this,
compare the last ten bars of the panels which correspond to combinations of
PEIAs).
Similar patterns arise for services trade and FDI. For instance, both the level of
positive outcome as well as the probability of a positive outcome in the absence of
any PEIA (the first bar in the respective graph) tend to be dominated by unimodal
or multimodal preferential policies (the other bars to the right of the None bar).
Moreover, multimodel PEIA strategies (the last ten bars in each panel) tend to be
associated with higher levels and a higher probability of positive outcome than uni-
modal strategies. Also services trade and FDI tend to display higher levels and prob-
abilities of positive outcome with unimodal DTTs or BITs than with unimodal
GTAs or STAs. However, for all three outcomes considered, the highest level or
probability of positive outcome is associated with some multimodal PEIA that
involves GTAs or STAs.
While Figure 2 is suggestive of a positive nexus between different PEIA strategies
and goods trade, services trade, and FDI, it does not permit causal statements. The
reason for the latter is that countries with particular characteristics – which themselves
cause outcome responses – select into specific modes of PEIAs so that the uncondi-
tional mean comparisons of outcomes are prone to self-selection bias. The aim of the
subsequent section is to avoid that self-selection bias by means of matching methods
which estimate unobservable counterfactual outcomes by conditioning on a set of ob-
servables so as to improve comparability between country-pairs with alternative PEIA
status and reduce if not avoid the self-selection bias.
6. ESTIMATION RESULTS
This section is structured as follows. First, we present the results of (non-linear prob-
ability) selection models into multinomial PEIA status. These models provide estim-
ates of the self-selection propensities of country-pairs into all observed states of
PEIA treatment in the data. Second, we use those propensities to compare outcomes
of country-pairs with different PEIA status to each other and estimate a matrix of
treatment effects, comparing different integration options with each other. We
will provide a comprehensive set of results for long-run responses to PEIA treatment
in 2005 and – for data reasons – summarize short-run responses (within five years
after treatment) only for the five most frequent transitions in the data according to
Table 3.
166 PETER EGGER AND GEORGWAMSER
6.1. Estimates of multivariate probit models for self-selection into PEIAs
In this subsection we present the results from a multivariate panel probit model based
on 5 modes of PEIAs. In contrast to a 5-nomial logit model, this model does neither
require that the alternatives are mutually exclusive nor does it impose the assumption
of an independence of the choices taken of irrelevant alternatives. In contrast to a 26-
nomial logit model, it does not require estimating 26 9 K but only 5 9 K parameters
on covariates. The purpose of this model is to capture the incentives to sign and
implement (or net utility associated with) individual PEIAs and combinations thereof.
We would expect PEIAs to be signed where the projected gains exceed the corres-
ponding costs.16
Table 7 summarizes the coefficient estimates for such a model which is pooled
across all years and includes fixed country-pair effects. After deleting observations for
which the observable variables are missing, we are left with 641,620 observations.
Notice that the multivariate probit model does not ensure that the estimated probabil-
ities sum up to unity over the 26 taken PEIA modes but they sum up over the 32 possible
PEIA modes. Hence, those probabilities have to be adjusted ex post so as to sum up to
unity for the 26 relevant modes.
The literature proposes a number of ways to assess the goodness of fit of these
models. In the sciences, it is common to use Matthews’ correlation coefficient (MCC)
for doing so. The latter chooses a suitable cut-off value to balance the alpha and beta
errors of predicting the binary PEIA modes. Denoting true positive predictions (i.e. a
status of one of the respective binary indicator variable) by TP, true negative predic-
tions by TN, and false positive and false negative predictions by FP and FN, respect-
ively, Matthews’ correlation coefficient for PEIA mode m is defined as
MCCm ¼ 100 TPmTNm  FPmFNmﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃðTPm þ FPmÞðTPm þ FNmÞðTNm þ FPmÞðTNm þ FNmÞ
p
Notice that TPm + TNm + FPm + FNm corresponds to the number of observations
for any mode m. MCCm is a compact measure of goodness of fit which is bounded in
unitary space. Moreover, it provides guidance for selection of a proper probability
16 Notice that for many of the included variables in the multivariate probit models we would associate
higher values of those variables with bigger net gains from concluding a PEIA (log distance is one excep-
tion from this). However, the estimated models are non-linear in the parameters. This entails that mar-
ginal effects of individual determinants depend on the values of other variables so that the models
implicitly include main effects and also interaction effects. In terms of the specification this means the fol-
lowing with a negative parameter on log distance and a positive one on joint country size. First, a bigger
distance or a smaller joint country size between two countries reduces their propensity of signing a specific
type of PEIA. However, a bigger distance should ceteris paribus be more detrimental for PEIA adoption
among larger than among smaller countries. Technically, the reason for the latter is that any type of PEIA
happens at relatively low probability, and the marginal effect of any determinant is small, then. However,
a larger joint country size for two economies raises that probability ceteris paribus. Since the marginal effect
of distance rises ceteris paribus with a higher probability of any PEIA, larger distances should be more harm-
ful for larger countries.
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Table 7. Multivariate treatment model
GTA STA DTT BIT CUA
SumGDPijt 0.002 1.042
*** 0.479*** 0.457*** 0.113*
(0.061) (0.080) (0.059) (0.095) (0.063)
SimGDPijt 0.209
*** 0.445*** 0.302*** 0.309*** 0.031
(0.039) (0.058) (0.045) (0.091) (0.047)
SumPOPijt 0.462
*** 0.394*** 0.124* 0.079 0.126*
(0.069) (0.092) (0.065) (0.107) (0.068)
SimPOPijt 0.793*** 1.141*** 0.503*** 0.136 0.155**
(0.089) (0.114) (0.072) (0.130) (0.067)
DKLijt 0.155*** 0.103 0.112** 0.497*** 0.027
(0.048) (0.082) (0.056) (0.128) (0.065)
DKL2ijt 0.017 0.037 0.118*** 0.288*** 0.023
(0.016) (0.028) (0.018) (0.050) (0.021)
Remoteij 0.126 5.299
*** 5.580*** 7.075*** 6.434***
(0.360) (0.710) (0.403) (0.782) (0.534)
DRKLijt 0.037 1.122*** 0.567*** 1.358*** 0.056
(0.054) (0.099) (0.064) (0.133) (0.059)
log Distanceij 0.353*** 0.115*** 0.511*** 0.449*** 0.137***
(0.026) (0.028) (0.025) (0.035) (0.026)
Common Borderij 0.359
*** 0.286*** 0.268*** 0.241** 0.142
(0.068) (0.090) (0.088) (0.117) (0.088)
Common Languageij 0.273
*** 0.084* 0.188*** 0.185** 0.831***
(0.037) (0.045) (0.047) (0.074) (0.028)
Same Continentij 0.239
*** 0.368*** 0.093** 0.331*** 0.237***
(0.038) (0.042) (0.040) (0.057) (0.036)
WTO Memberijt (one) 0.446
*** 0.859*** 0.256*** 0.363*** 0.103***
(0.047) (0.079) (0.052) (0.102) (0.036)
WTO Memberijt (both) 0.701
*** 1.219*** 0.490*** 0.394*** 0.108***
(0.053) (0.084) (0.058) (0.110) (0.042)
Landlockedij (one) 0.002 0.763*** 0.124*** 0.254*** 0.056*
(0.038) (0.046) (0.038) (0.052) (0.033)
Landlockedij (both) 0.130* 1.427*** 0.305*** 0.394*** 0.059
(0.077) (0.113) (0.111) (0.119) (0.103)
CDWijt 3.00E-05 2.00E-05 2.00E-04** 1.00E-04*** 2.00E-05
(5.00E-05) (4.00E-05) (6.00E-05) (4.00E-05) (4.00E-05)
DYWijt 1.00E-04 1.04E-06 1.00E-04 2.00E-04** 7.00E-05
(8.00E-04) (1.00E-04) (9.00E-05) (9.00E-05) (1.00E-04)
DRDijt 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
DPFijt 0.009*** 0.005** 0.011*** 0.017*** 0.007***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
WGTAijt-1 7.493
*** 12.486*** 5.730*** 5.929*** 1.700***
(0.347) (0.565) (0.432) (1.020) (0.591)
WSTAijt-1 3.064*** 10.935*** 7.672*** 8.977*** 3.708***
(0.363) (0.993) (0.476) (1.116) (0.885)
WDTTijt-1 7.707*** 5.440*** 4.854*** 17.031*** 5.141***
(0.603) (1.042) (0.661) (1.226) (0.816)
WBITijt-1 16.177
*** 29.929*** 11.432*** 26.585*** 14.385***
(0.995) (2.133) (1.093) (1.948) (2.061)
WCUAijt-1 14.517*** 5.710*** 1.171** 4.147*** 10.022***
(0.882) (1.002) (0.484) (1.221) (0.523)
MCC 69.21 69.51 68.94 70.66 68.63
(0.68) (0.73) (0.70) (0.58) (0.69)
Notes: 641,620 observations. Multivariate probit model. Pair-specific means and year trends included. ***, **,
and * indicate that coefficients are significantly different from zero at 1, 5, and 10%, respectively. Robust and
clustered (by country-pair) standard errors in parentheses. MCC is the maximum attainable Matthews’ correla-
tion coefficient of the estimated models. The values reported materialize at the probability cut-off values reported
in parentheses below.
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cut-off value, at and above which we associate probabilities as to suggest a prediction
of a binary indicator value of one (positive) and below which we associate them with a
zero value (negative). At the cut-off value which maximizes MCCm, the level of MCCm
indicates the goodness of fit of the estimated models, akin to an R2 in linear regres-
sions. For computation ofMCCm, we have to employ the m-specific vector of estimated
probabilities for selection into the mth PEIA mode. Similar to the parameter estimates,
those probabilities have to be simulated by Monte Carlo methods. The corresponding
MCC coefficient for each mode and the probability cut-off level at which it material-
izes (the latter in parentheses) are given at the bottom of Table 7.17
The findings with regard to self-selection into PEIA modes can be summarized as
follows. First, the values of MCCm are quite high. In general, the predictive power is
lowest for CUAs, and it is highest for BITs. Consistent with the great variability of the
frequency of events across PEIA modes, the highest attainable predictive power as
captured by MCCm is reached at rather different mode-specific probability cut-off
values. However, the measure is rather stable in a fairly large neighbourhood around
the optimal cut-off level. For instance, MCCm does not change by more than one per-
centage point within a symmetric interval of about 30 percentage points in probability
space around the optimum cut-off probabilities. Second, many of the coefficients on
observables are significantly different from zero at conventional levels. This suggests
that the included observables are relevant determinants of self-selection into PEIA
modes. When considering parameter point estimates, many of them are in line with
earlier results from the literature considering univariate selection into PEIA modes:
most of the observables included in the PEIA selection models would take on the same
parameter signs in (reduced-form) gravity models of bilateral goods exports, services
exports, or stocks of outward FDI.18 The latter suggests that those countries which
have stronger trade or foreign investment relationships also tend to integrate more
likely in PEIAs of one or the other form. This is in line with the argument that the
17 We provide a table including correlation coefficients for the disturbances across PEIA modes in a sep-
arate Web Appendix. We ran various alternative multivariate selection models to the one in Table 7. For
instance, we ran models that distinguished between deep and shallow GTAs, using the classification intro-
duced by Horn et al. (2010). Following their work, the WTO classified numerous GTAs accordingly, which
would allow for many more types. However, this leads to more and to smaller treatment and control
groups so that the treatment effect estimation becomes the more imprecise, the more such types one distin-
guishes. Similarly, one could distinguish between PEIAs prior to the mid-1990s and after that since many
GTAs concluded in the latter period contain non-goods-trade-related provisions (see also Baldwin, 2011).
Moreover, in an alternative set of models we classified BIT as unity whenever a GTA included investment
provisions. Finally, we estimated dynamic multivariate probit models, following Wooldridge’s (2005)
approach towards the modelling of initial conditions. The associated results cannot be presented here for
reasons of space constraints, but they are included in a Web Appendix.
18 Notice that the results for the time-variant variables are difficult to compare with earlier work. For
instance, we include measures of country size in terms of GDP as well as population. Hence, the measures
relating to GDP, conditional on population size, reflect an impact of total (average) and relative (similarity
of) productivity, while population reflects country size itself. Other authors such as Baier and Bergstrand
(2004) did not include both measures together, but the parameter estimates suggest that either of them
should be included in the empirical model.
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benefits from integration are larger among natural integration partners, and it sug-
gests that one should be careful with drawing firm quantitative conclusions from
unconditional mean comparisons as from Figure 2, since they are likely masked by a
self-selection bias. Third, the means of the time-variant variables (not reported) are
jointly significant at 1% in any one of the equations. This indicates that there are time
invariant determinants PEIA integration is correlated with, and by pooling the selec-
tion models across time without taking care of the time-invariant unobservable vari-
ables runs at risk of parameter bias. Fourth, there is a significant correlation between
the disturbances across PEIA modes, on average. Thus, by modelling selection into
alternative PEIA modes as independent processes, one incurs a risk of parameter bias.
The predicted probabilities of adopting any one out of the five PEIA modes can
now be used to predict the response probabilities of all 26 used options of combining
those modes, denoted psijt for selection of country-pair ij in year t into treatment s (see
the Appendix for more details). As said before, to ensure that the estimated probabil-
ities sum up to unity across all actually used options, we rescale them by distributing
the estimated ones of unused treatments across all used treatments proportionately to
the relative probability mass. Let us denote rescaled probabilities of selecting into
treatment s as ~psijt . We may use ~p
s
ijt to estimate the unobserved outcome for counterfac-
tual treatment, say, ~s, and determine the treatment and control groups based on
~psijt and ~p
~s
ijt for the subsample of observations which actually received treatment s or ~s
as indicated in the Appendix.
6.2. Estimates of ‘long-run’ treatment effects of PEIAs in 2005
We enforce three conditions for the quality of matching – that is, the construction of
the control group: first, there is common support in the domain of ps ¼ ðpsijtÞ for units
that received treatment s versus ones that received, say, ~s; second, we only use treated
and control observations within a radius of 1% in ps-space for matching; third, after
matching based on ps, the comparison between units with treatment s versus ~s is not
driven by first-moment differences in any observables determining treatment status;
finally, we focus on treatment effects where at least 50 observations are available.
Hence, we will consider fewer treatment-control comparisons than is possible from
Table 2.
To assess long-run effects of PEIAs on outcome, we focus on data of 2005. In this
sense, matching ensures that treated observations of 2005 are matched onto ones of
the same year, but we disregard any time structure in the acquisition of treatment sta-
tus. Since the high number of treatment-control-group combinations implies that hun-
dreds of possible treatment effects could be estimated, let us primarily focus on
treatment effects using as a control group those units with a no-PEIA treatment. The
matching results for average treatment effects of the treated (ATTs) are presented in
Table 8. Each column refers to one of the six outcomes. The results show a very clear
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pattern: more integration (compared with no integration at all) of any kind is associ-
ated with a positive treatment effect.19
One interesting finding in Table 8 is that the extensive margin of bilateral activity
is often not affected by any kind of integration. However, we find effects on the extens-
ive margin of goods exports when country-pairs enter a GTA- or a GTA cum DTT-
type of integration (Treatments 10 and 12), which seems plausible. With regard to the
intensive margin of goods exports, treatment combinations involving a BIT lead to
particularly large treatment effects. The largest ATT, though, is estimated for coun-
try-pairs which concluded every type of PEIA but a CUA (last treatment combination
in Table 8). The findings for services exports confirm for both margins that BITs as
well as DTTs, both aiming at the activities of multinational firms, have effects on
bilateral economic activity that go beyond the bilateral activity of multinational firms.
At the intensive margin of services exports, we estimate the largest ATT (1.30) for a
combination involving three PEIA modes (a GTA, an STA, and a DTT). Finally, we
find that the extensive margin of bilateral FDI is negatively affected when a DTT is
combined with a BIT or when a DTT is combined with a GTA. While both findings
seem counterintuitive, we should note that DTTs not only include double taxation
relief for multinational firms, but also facilitate information exchange between coun-
tries so that tax avoidance becomes more difficult for multinationals and, thus, FDI
less attractive.
As for the intensive goods exports margin, the largest effect is found for the com-
bination GTA, STA, DTT, and BIT. The estimated ATT implies that integration in
these four dimensions is associated with about 750% more bilateral FDI relative to
the counterfactual situation of no integration at all. This quantitatively significant
effect highlights the huge long-run benefits of integration in general and (goods and
services) trade and investment liberalization in particular.
Figure 3 summarizes all estimated (and significant) ATTs for all possible treatment-
control combinations. For each outcome, we report two standard box plots: the left
(right) one always corresponds to effects for which the number of any kind of PEIAs in
the treatment (control) group exceeds the number of PEIAs in the control (treatment)
19 We have replicated Table 8 using a simple OLS framework, unconditionally comparing outcome of
the treatment combinations as listed in Table 8 with those of the control group without any PEIA
(detailed results are reported in the Web Appendix). A comparison between the unconditional OLS estim-
ates and our basic findings broadly suggests that ATTs are typically overestimated by OLS, while standard
errors are typically underestimated. As our matching approach relies on estimated probabilities which
may differ according to the specification of the selection model, we also performed rank correlation tests
for the models mentioned in n. 17. To do this, we proceeded in three steps. First, we used predicted proba-
bilities for 32 PEIA modes from different model specifications and ranked these probabilities in ascending
order. Second, we calculated pair-wise correlation coefficients for the ranks between the different specifi-
cations. Third, we determined the (weighted) average of these correlations (as weights, we used the num-
ber of matched country-pairs in Table 8). We found a correlation coefficient of 0.93 between the basic
specification and the specification which employs an adjusted measure of BITs, setting it to unity for deep
trade agreements which include investment provisions. The correlation coefficient between the basic spec-
ification and the dynamic multivariate selection specification is 0.54.
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group, so that we would expect rather positive (negative) ATTs. Denoting the number
of PEIAs of the treatment (control) group by TG (CG), we provide information on
whether the number of PEIAs is lower or higher in the treatment group relative to
the control group ( TG7CG) below each figure. Note that Figure 3 includes all
Table 8. Long-run effects of PEIAs (control: no PEIA)
Treatment:
Goods exports Services exports FDI
Margin
Extensive Intensive Extensive Intensive Extensive Intensive
0 0 0 0 1 0.067 0.379 0.105 . 0.224 .
(0.054) (0.392) (0.102) . (0.150) .
0 0 0 1 0 0.079** 2.420*** 0.035 0.322 0.131* 1.437*
(0.040) (0.317) (0.097) (0.454) (0.080) (0.765)
0 0 1 0 0 0.078*** 1.547*** 0.175** 0.695*** 0.004 1.133***
(0.009) (0.096) (0.024) (0.107) (0.025) (0.253)
0 0 1 1 0 0.040*** 2.228*** 0.132** 0.881*** 0.098*** 1.548***
(0.011) (0.150) (0.026) (0.148) (0.036) (0.385)
0 0 1 1 1 0.034 2.671*** . . 0.019 .
(0.143) (0.930) . . (0.190) .
0 1 0 0 0 0.023 0.383*** . . 0.025 0.002
(0.019) (0.144) . . (0.065) (0.658)
0 1 0 1 0 0.051 2.559*** . . . .
(0.090) (0.686) . . . .
0 1 1 0 0 0.062 2.009*** . . 0.275* .
(0.056) (0.590) . . (0.168) .
0 1 1 1 0 0.048 2.312*** . . . .
(0.059) (0.917) . . .
1 0 0 0 0 0.132*** 0.968*** 0.059 0.094 0.122** 0.280
(0.022) (0.149) (0.081) (0.322) (0.060) (0.596)
1 0 0 1 0 0.036 1.944* 0.133** 1.003*** . .
(0.179) (1.112) (0.069) (0.337) . .
1 0 1 0 0 0.109*** 1.544*** . . 0.116** .
(0.024) (0.221) . . (0.054) .
1 0 1 1 0 0.020 1.602*** 0.050 0.802*** 0.004 .
(0.042) (0.414) (0.071) (0.394) (0.114) .
1 1 0 0 0 0.057 0.193 . . 0.045 1.525
(0.041) (0.286) . . (0.107) (1.261)
1 1 0 1 0 0.103 2.883*** . . 0.281 .
(0.183) (1.165) . . (0.229) .
1 1 1 0 0 0.039 2.764*** 0.111 1.303*** 0.156** 0.424
(0.030) (0.253) (0.085) (0.334) (0.062) (0.749)
1 1 1 0 1 0.047 2.792*** 0.018 1.24 0.049 .
(0.171) (1.121) (0.246) (0.807) (0.256) .
1 1 1 1 0 0.054 2.932*** 0.052 1.021*** 0.187** 2.135***
(0.037) (0.357) (0.093) (0.411) (0.089) (0.740)
Notes: Reported are treatment effects (ATTs) and standard errors (in parentheses) from weighted regressions with
at least 50 observations. The control group corresponds to no PEIA at all (0 0 0 0 0). 5-digit codes of the treat-
ments correspond to the following PEIA modes: GTA, STA, DTT, BIT, CUA; GTAs are Goods Trade Agree-
ments; STAs are Services Trade Agreements; DTTs are Double Taxation Treaties; BITs are Bilateral
Investment Treaties; and CUAs are Currency Union Agreements which include unions with one currency as well
as currency pegs. Extensive margin is the probability of positive bilateral goods exports, services exports, and
FDI, respectively. Intensive margin is the log of bilateral goods exports, services exports, and FDI, respectively.
Dots denote that coefficients could not be estimated because of insufficient observations.
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coefficients for which at least 50 observations were available, and which proved signif-
icant at the 10% level.20 The figure suggests that trade (of goods or services) will likely
rise if PEIAs are implemented in or added to existing ones. The results for the exten-
sive margin are much less clear-cut. The latter is not surprising since PEIAs are rarely
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Figure 3. Distribution of (significant) long-run treatment effects
20 We provide the same graphs based on all estimated coefficients, including the insignificant ones, in the
Web Appendix.
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implemented among countries where no cross-border economic activity is going on at
all before.
6.3. Estimates of ‘short-run’ treatment effects of PEIAs
While we did not condition on the treatment state of origin or the timing of treatment
adoption in the analysis of long-run ATTs as defined in the previous subsection, we
will scrutinize these issues in this subsection. Here, we estimate ATTs conditional on
the state of origin so that treated and control units have the same PEIA treatment in
an interval of five years prior to treatment of the treated, τ ∈ [5, 1]. While the
control units stay in the state of origin after that, the treated switch at time τ = 0 and
stay in that new state during τ ∈ [0, +5] while the control units are required to stay in
the state of origin. Outcomes of the treated and the matched control units are then
compared over the time path τ ∈ [0, + 5] as outlined in the Appendix. Hence, in con-
trast to the long-run effects in the previous subsection, it is now ensured that (i) all
treated units switch into treatment at time τ = 0, (ii) that all treated and untreated
units each have an identical treatment in any year considered, and (iii) that the treat-
ment between the treated and controls is identical at time τ < 0. Since we consider
effects only up to generic year τ = 5, we dub such ATTs short-run effects. Table 9
summarizes those short-run ATTs for the five most frequent treatment switches
according to Table 3.
For brevity, we report ATTs of a treatment change in generic period τ = 0 on the
extensive country margin of any outcome in period τ = 0 and on the intensive coun-
try margin in periods τ = 0, …, 5. The results can be summarized as follows. First,
countries display short-run effects in response to changes in treatment relatively rap-
idly after treatment at both the extensive and the intensive country margin on out-
come. This conclusion can be drawn when considering the estimated evolution of
ATTs at the intensive margin after new treatment. Moreover, it can be drawn when
comparing the results in Table 9 with the corresponding ones in Table 8. For ex-
ample, while the average response of a country-pair to a switch out of the situation
with no PEIA at all into one with just a DTT amounts to about 1.32 immediately
after the switch, the corresponding long-run effect shown in Table 8 is about 1.55.
Second, the short-run findings broadly confirm the long-run results: the response to
DTT integration is strong not only for FDI but also for goods trade; switching out of
a situation with integration into a situation without integration is associated with a
negative treatment effect; the effects of CUAs are ambiguous; integration by GTA or
STA seems to cause negative effects on FDI. The reason for the latter might be, and
this could be particularly the case for STAs affecting services trade within multina-
tional firms, that STAs entail agreements on information exchange between countries
which restrict the firms’ opportunities for tax planning in general and transfer pricing
in particular.
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Unfortunately, missing data on outcomes such as services trade and FDI stocks do
not permit giving as complete a picture as we wished to.21 Hence, an econometric
analysis of ATT dynamics which relies on the rich pattern of PEIA adoptions as out-
lined in Tables 2–4 is unfortunately not feasible for many treatments in general and
for just a very few treatments in case of services and goods trade. We have to wait for
nature to generate more data on this to be able to shed light on the impact of such
changes in subsequent work.
8. CONCLUSIONS
Unlike previous research, this paper considers joint selection into and effects of five
modes of preferential economic integration agreements (PEIAs): goods trade agree-
Table 9. Short-run effects of PEIAs
Out-in Out-in Out-in Out-in Out-in
Outcome:
00000–
00100
00001–
00000
00000–
10000
00000–
01000
00000–
00001
P(goods trade>0)(τ=0) 0.120 0.623 0.056 0.037 0.056
Goods trade(τ=0) 1.319 0.326 0.334 0.054 0.352
Goods trade(τ=1) 1.285 0.423 0.314 0.031 0.037
Goods trade(τ=2) 1.364 0.175 0.393 0.126 0.001
Goods trade(τ=3) 1.421 0.079 0.559 0.085 0.017
Goods trade(τ=4) 1.434 0.190 0.518 0.061 0.080
Goods trade(τ=5) 1.547 0.264 0.629 0.018 0.242
P(services trade>0)(τ=0) 0.165 . 0.250 . .
Services trade(τ=0) 0.209 . 0.500 . .
Services trade(τ=1) 0.132 . 0.089 . .
Services trade(τ=2) 0.182 . . . .
Services trade(τ=3) 0.016 . . . .
Services trade(τ=4) 0.017 . . . 0.087
Services trade(τ=5) 0.198 . . . 0.308
P(FDI stocks>0)(τ=0) 0.049 . 0.080 0.021 0.074
FDI stocks(τ=0) 0.775 . 0.658 2.313 .
FDI stocks(τ=1) 1.044 . 0.227 5.756 .
FDI stocks(τ=2) 0.929 . . 4.717 .
FDI stocks(τ=3) 0.938 . . 1.989 .
FDI stocks(τ=4) 1.438 . 2.494 0.509 0.253
FDI stocks(τ=5) 1.268 . 0.381 0.085 .
Notes: Reported are average estimated coefficients. 5-digit codes of the heading line correspond to the following
PEIA modes: GTA, STA, DTT, BIT, CUA; GTAs are Goods Trade Agreements; STAs are Services Trade
Agreements; DTTs are Double Taxation Treaties; BITs are Bilateral Investment Treaties; and CUAs are Cur-
rency Union Agreements which include unions with one currency as well as currency pegs. Dots indicate that
coefficients could not be estimated because of insufficient observations.
21 Recall that we require that no treatment change occurred at least five years prior to the change invest-
igated in Table 9. This leads to relatively small windows of data available for, e.g. services trade and FDI
stocks.
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ments (GTAs), services trade agreements (STAs), double taxation treaties (DTTs),
bilateral investment treaties (BITs), and currency unions as well as currency pegs
(CUAs). In a broad descriptive analysis we unveil typical integration patterns of econ-
omies. Using individual PEIAs in isolation appears to be a rare strategy. The consid-
ered PEIAs obviously address not only goods trade but also trade in services as well as
foreign direct investment. It is a potential shortcoming that virtually all previous
research considered only one of those outcomes at a time. Such a strategy may be mis-
leading to the extent that the three mentioned outcomes go hand in hand not only
because of the engagement of multinational firms in goods trade (their engagement in
services trade is natural due to the supply of headquarters services within multi-
national networks), but also due to complementarities of such activities by way of
information exchange about markets and contracts across (exporting and foreign
investing) firms in the same parent country.
Our investigation shows that single and combined PEIAs tend to trigger positive
effects not only on single outcome but typically on all outcomes. While GTAs are
often concluded in a first integration step, the effects on goods trade with investment
liberalization through BITs or DTTs in a first step are typically much larger than
when liberalizing goods trade per se. Hence, it appears important to consider the inter-
dependence of goods trade, services trade, and foreign direct investment when adopt-
ing measures of preferential liberalization. It is not necessarily the case that the most
direct PEIA measures available display the largest effects on a primarily targeted out-
come of interest. Moving first in (or combining preferential trade liberalization with)
investment liberalization promises bigger effects for goods trade than when focusing
on liberalizing tariff and non-tariff barriers to goods trade alone. In general, covering
several issues (such as trade, services, and investment) tends to benefit each outcome
more likely and to a larger extent than when focusing on single-issue liberalization. In
part, this is reflected in the reality of today’s treaty drafts that often reach out to issues
which lie beyond their intended scope (e.g. GTAs include regulations about invest-
ment, etc.). Offering a mix of PEIA modes to international business seems to be a
viable alternative to such practice.
Our descriptive analysis shows that many country-pairs start out with signing DTTs
as one form of liberalizing investment in a broad sense. When comparing effects on
outcomes, DTTs and, similarly, BITs – as a second form of preferential investment
liberalization – display large effects on outcomes. Thus, in comparison, we should see
more BITs in view of their relatively large effects not only on investment but also on
goods trade. In other words, the evidence suggests that BITs are under-represented
relative to GTAs or DTTs in international economic policy regarding their relatively
sizeable effects on economic activity. With respect to sequencing, we would expect rel-
atively more countries to sign BITs relative to GTAs or STAs as a first preferential
integration step and, subsequently, to combine them with trade agreements (GTAs or
STAs).
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Discussion
Thorsten Beck
University of Tilburg
This is an important and policy-relevant paper that explains the adoption of different
combination of agreements between countries on preferential market access, including
agreements on goods trade, services trade, foreign direct investment, double taxation
and currency unions. More importantly, the authors link the different combinations
of such agreements to actual trade and FDI between country pairs over time. Com-
pared to the previous literature, this paper takes a more comprehensive look at differ-
ent agreements, while previous papers have considered specific forms of agreements,
be they on trade in goods, trade in services or FDI.
If one wants to set the paper in the broader context of the literature, it links the lit-
erature on the determinants of international trade and the literature on what drives
preferential economic integration agreements, including political economy determin-
ants. By using a multinomial selection model, the authors gauge both the long-term
effects of specific combinations of these agreements and the short-run responses to
transitioning from one combination to another (e.g. by adding an additional agree-
ment), while controlling for selection bias and potential endogeneity.
While the paper provides interesting and important insights, I have some concep-
tual concerns. The first concern refers to the list of agreements the authors have cho-
sen. While taking a much more comprehensive view on integration agreements than
the literature typically does, there are other important elements missing that can
explain international trade in goods and services and foreign direct investment,
including capital account liberalization, labour market integration, visa-free travel
and so on. Where does one draw the line and does the limitation to specific agree-
ments result in an omitted-variable bias? Second, what is the effect of preferential
economic integration agreements compared to other policies that might explain vari-
ation in trade and foreign direct investment? And, finally, are we asking the right
question by gauging the relationship between these agreements on trade rather than
looking at the additional effect of the agreements on trade beyond what would be the
natural level of trade between two countries. I would expect the effect of such agree-
ments to vary across country-pairs that have different levels of natural trade, related
to distance, different history etc. By including these determinants of natural trade
intensity as determinants of preferential agreements, the authors might overestimate
the effect of agreements on trade.
I would like to add some comments on the estimations. Since World War II, there
has been a general trend towards global trade agreements, which might have strength-
ened the effect of preferential agreements between two or more countries. It is not
quite clear whether this is properly controlled for. Further, there might be a critical
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difference between bilateral and multilateral agreements that is not captured in the
current analysis.
In summary, this paper presents a fascinating dataset and sets out a very relevant
and timely research agenda. I expect additional analysis in future work to disentangle
the effects of different preferential economic integration agreements and their
sequencing on international trade and investment, including differential impact across
different country groupings.
Paola Conconi
Free University of Brussels
This paper uses a rich dataset, covering 210 economies over the period 1960–2005,
to examine both selection into and the impact of five modes of preferential economic
integration agreements (PEIAs): goods trade agreements (GTAs), services trade agree-
ments (STAs), double taxation treaties (DTTs), bilateral investment treaties (BITs),
and currency unions/ currency pegs (CUAs).
The analysis consists of two main steps. First, the authors estimate a multivariate
non-linear probability model to examine countries’ choices among 26 PEIA config-
urations (out of the possible 32). Second, they examine the implications of these agree-
ments choices on the probability and the level of bilateral trade in goods and services,
as well as the probability and the level of bilateral foreign direct investment (FDI). To
deal with concerns of self-selection of country-pairs into different agreements, the
authors use propensity score matching, estimating the probability of each country pair
of receiving the treatment (i.e. being in one kind of PEIA arrangement) and selecting
only those treated and untreated units with comparable propensities. A key assump-
tion to be able to apply this methodology to international agreements is that, after
controlling for economic, geographical and political variables driving selection into
PEIAs, there should be enough randomness in whether or not governments actually
sign an agreement or in when an agreement is signed.
In general, the paper challenges the existing literature assessing the impact of
preferential agreements. Previous studies in this literature focus one policy area
(e.g. trade agreements), without considering possible interactions with agreements
in other policy areas (e.g. tax treaties). Implicitly, these studies assume that the vari-
ous types of agreements are concluded independently of each other and that they
do not influence each other’s impact in determining outcome. Egger and Wamser
provide evidence of an important overlap in the conclusion of different types of
PEIAs, emphasizing the difficulty of examining their impact in isolation from each
other.
An interesting finding of this study is that agreements that cover several issues
(e.g. trade and investment) are more likely to benefit trade and FDI (both at the
extensive and intensive margin) than agreements focusing on single-issue liberaliza-
tion. This supports the idea that trade and FDI are complements, for example, due
to the global fragmentation of production (Head and Ries, 2004) or to information
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spillovers (within and between) firms serving foreign markets via exports or FDI
(Conconi et al., 2012).
The paper focuses on bilateral agreement choices. In reality, most PEIAs are not
limited to two countries and strategic interactions play a key role in governments’
decisions on whether to sign preferential agreements. Indeed, the results presented in
Table 7 show that systemic variables (the number of countries having already signed
different types of PEIAs) are the most important determinants of governments’
choices, emphasizing the importance of ‘contagion effects’ (Baldwin, 1993). An inter-
esting avenue for future research is to further explore strategic effects across preferen-
tial agreements.
Panel discussion
Andrea Ichino was slightly sceptical about the use of propensity score matching (PSM)
in the empirical analysis. He argued that in order to employ this technique the authors
should have a clear story explaining why, conditioning on the explanatory variables,
the treatment should be random. Ichino also emphasized that the assumption of inde-
pendence across observations is required for the application of PSM and wondered
whether the countries could be considered as independent observations. Regarding
the first-stage of the multivariate probit, Isabel Schnabel asked how the authors deal
with the persistence of treatments.
Replying to Paola Conconi, Peter Egger said that they also have results on the
deepening of trade agreements. In particular, in one regression they distinguish
between deep and shallow goods trade agreements. However, Egger warned the
panel that disentangling the two also broadens the number of modes and leads to
smaller cells, which in turn makes it more difficult to estimate treatment effects.
According to Egger, this approach in the extreme results in just case studies and
impedes comparison-making. Addressing Schnabel’s question, he pointed out that
dynamic selection models were estimated (probabilities compared and ranked).
Referring to Thorsten Beck’s discussion, Egger indicated that a mixture of PSM
and weighted regressions was used in the study and that the relevant variables were
in addition controlled for in the second step. He reiterated that they always condi-
tion on the same observables that enter the selection equation in the second step
when estimating the average treatment effects. On the issues of heterogeneous
treatment effects and emphasizing contagion, Egger felt that these were good points
and said that he would think about them more. He also agreed with Beck that it
would be useful to examine other policy issues (labour market, competition policies
etc.) but at the same time raised the argument that this would reduce the cell sizes
for each of the considered combinations (hence a trade-off). Egger, like Beck,
PREFERENTIAL MARKET ACCESS 179
thought that a short-term approach would have been better but said that it was
not very feasible (link to the literature would be lost, numbers become small – data
generating process not running long enough). Moving on to Ichino’s comments,
Egger contended that there is enough randomization present to validate the PSM
methodology. Specifically, he noted that although countries may have plans to rat-
ify a treaty, they might not when the time comes. Egger concluded the discussion
by saying that general equilibrium effects should not be too large as otherwise they
would appear at the level of the outcome equation which would violate the main
assumption.
APPENDIX A. CONCEPTS AND ASSUMPTIONS FOR ESTIMATION OF
MULTIPLE ENDOGENOUS TREATMENT EFFECTS
A.1. SOME NOTATION AND CONCEPTS
The problem at stake is one of 32 mutually exclusive treatment states a generic coun-
try-pair ij ∈ {1,…, N} may take in any generic year t ∈ {1,…, T}. Broadly following
Dorn and Egger (2011), let us refer by sijt to a realization of a specific treatment state
of pair ij in year t of the 32-nomial variable St, containing all possible states. Hence, at
any time t there is a sequence of Tt 32-nomial random variables, St ¼ ðS1; . . .; StÞ, and
a sequence of specific realizations of sijt = (sij1, …, sijt) with sijt. Clearly, as time
marches on, sijt is drawn from an enormously large set of 32
t possible treatment transi-
tions. Each sequence sijt is associated with potential outcomes yijt. For a given realiza-
tion sijt of sequence St, let us refer to the potential outcome in levels as y
s
ijt .
Since country-pairs are only observed in one treatment state at a time, we have to
impute (estimate) unobserved counterfactual states. Let us denote those counterfactual
states at time t by ~sijt . Using the same notation, let us refer to the counterfactual rea-
lization of the random sequence S by ~sijt , and to the corresponding counterfactual
outcomes by y
~s
ijt .
Suppose there is a K 9 1 random vector of covariates X with realization xijt in t for
country-pair ij. We assume that country-pair ij chooses sequence St = sijt versus
St ¼ ~sijt ; depending on xijt .22 Following Dorn and Egger (2011), v may denote the
support of values xijt the random vector X can take on.
With multiple treatment effects (i.e. St having more than two elements), there are
several types of treatment effects one might consider (see Lechner, 2001). First of all,
there is a treatment effect on the treated (ATT), which is defined as
hs;~st ðX ¼ xijt 2 vÞ ¼ Eðysijt  y~sijtÞ for all xijt ∈ v and all ij ∈ {1, …,Ns) or, in short, hs;~sijt .
22 Implicitly, this assumes that xijt contains relevant information about xijs with s < t. This can be ensured
by including lagged values of the covariates in xijt, and/or by conditioning on treatment states prior to t.
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Then, there are two concepts of average treatment effects. One is a weighted average
of hs;~sijt and h
~s;s
ijt . Following Lechner (2001), we may refer to it by a
s;~s
ijt . A second one is a
weighted average not only of h
s;~s
ijt , and h
~s;s
ijt but of all h
s;~s0
ijt and h
~s0;s
ijt , which we might call
c
s;~s
ijt . Notice that, with a 32-nomial treatment problem, there are 32-1 variants of ~s
0
(i.e. the states in year t given a common history) and, hence, a gigantic amount of vari-
ants of ~s0 (i.e. forms of the whole history up to t).
Clearly, with 32 possible treatment states and 46 years, the amount of possible
treatment effect estimates is virtually indigestible. Therefore, we decided to focus
mainly on ATTs of levels for the year 2005, disregarding country-pairs’ histories,
and, alternatively, on ATTs with a common history within a well-defined time
window. For ATTs in 2005, we use treated and control units only for that year.
For ATTs in any year t, we use an 11-year, centred, consecutive time window
around the date of switching into treatment. Then, we compare treated units
which changed treatment in the sixth consecutive year with ones that did not
switch their status within the same time window (i.e. nor before nor after the
treated switched).
A.2. A BRIEF SUMMARY OF ASSUMPTIONS
For a causal interpretation of the estimated treatment effects, let us briefly and largely
informally state the necessary assumptions (see Dorn and Egger, 2011, for a formal
statement of those assumptions in a different context).
• Assumption 1: Conditional independence. We assume that we may restore
independence of units of observation by conditioning on a vector of observable
variables X = xijt and, eventually, on the treatment state prior to switching (see
Lechner, 2001; Lee, 2005).
• Assumption 2: Exogeneity of the initial state and stationary one-
period transition probabilities. By this assumption, one can simply condition
on the initial treatment status (i.e. the one prior to t) when estimating treatment effects
in t (see Lechner, 2004, for a version of this assumption). Furthermore, the marginal
probability of pair ij to be observed with treatment status St ¼ sijt is a first-order station-
aryMarkov-chain, once we condition on state Ss = sijswith s < t andX = xijt.
• Assumption 3: Balancing score. This assumption ensures that we can use the
scalar-valued function p (X = xijt ) instead of all elements in X = xijt separately to
solve the selection problem.
• Assumption 4: Common support. We have to ensure that sufficiently
comparable control units – i.e. ones with sufficiently similar characteristics
X = xijt and balancing score p
s (X = xijt) – are used to impute the unobserved
counterfactual treatment state of treated units and vice versa.
Based on Assumptions 1–4, all treatment effects of interest are pair-wise identified
conditional on the balancing score ps (X = xijt ) and the initial treatment state (in
PREFERENTIAL MARKET ACCESS 181
s < t). Provided this, we may employ matching on ps (X = xijt) to resolve the problem
of self-selection of country-pairs into the 32 treatment states.
A.3. PROPENSITY SCORE ESTIMATION AND MATCHING ALGORITHM
A.3.1. Propensity score estimation algorithm
For the treatment problem with more than two treatment states at hand,
psijt ¼ psðX ¼ xijtÞ has to be estimated from multinomial choice models. Obvious can-
didates are a 32-nomial logit model based on 32 mutually exclusive treatment states23
or a 5-variate probit model with potentially correlated treatment indicators. We chose
to follow the latter approach. Moreover, with 46 years covered, ps (X = xijt) can be
estimated from a pooled model or from annual or clusters-of-years choice models.
Due to better convergence properties, we estimated a pooled time-series cross-section
multivariate probit model. Obviously, there is a strong time pattern in the choices.
We accounted for the latter by basing the index (or latent process) underlying the
choice model on a specification of X = xijt which includes time averages per country-
pair of all the covariates (following the so-called Mundlak–Chamberlain–Wooldridge
device)24 plus a common time trend. Thus, we estimate seemingly unrelated regression non-
linear probability models which account for the interdependence of the choices of the
five modes not only by means of explanatory variables but also in terms of unobserv-
ables captured by the disturbances. For the 5-variate probit model based on 5 corre-
lated equations, let us specify the latent process for the latent variable h‘;ijt of equation
(i.e., PEIA mode) ‘, country – pair ij, and time t as a linear function of the 1 9 K vec-
tor xijt.
25 Let us denote the K 9 1 vector of unknown parameters on xijt in equation ‘
by b‘. Finally, let us denote the stochastic term by e‘;ijt :h‘;ijt generates an indicator
variable for the ‘th PEIA mode through the function h‘;ijt ¼ 1½h‘;ijt[ 0. Stacking the
model for all country-pairs ij and years t and writing vectors in bold-face letters, we
may state the model for mode ‘ as
h‘ ¼ xb‘ þ e‘;h‘ ¼ 1½h‘[ 0; ‘ ¼ 1; . . .; 5
The error terms e‘,ijt, ‘ = 1, …, 5 are assumed to be distributed as multivariate
normal with zero mean and a variance-covariance matrix V. Specific to this
model is that it allows the off-diagonal elements of V to be non-zero. The para-
meters b‘ and the error correlations among the five equations along with the 32
23 Recall that only 26 of the 32 options in Table 2 are actually taken, so that one would actually estimate
a 26-nomial logit model.
24 Hence, the model includes fixed country-pair effects which are parameterized as a linear function of
time-averaged observables (see Wooldridge, 2002).
25 In a reduced form of the 5-variate latent process, we may suppress an equation index with xijt and allow
the latent process in each equation h to depend on the same observables without loss of generality.
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PT
t¼1 Nt  1 vectors ps with elements psijt ¼ ps X ¼ xijt
 
can be estimated by
Monte Carlo integration of the maximum likelihood function and a 5-variate nor-
mal distribution, respectively.26 For this, we followed Johnson et al. (2000) and
Craig (2008) in employing the Gauss–Legendre method. Prediction of the propen-
sities of participating in a particular type of PEIA and, hence, propensities for all
32 (or 26 actually taken) treatments as in Table 2 can be retrieved from Monte
Carlo integration as well.
A.3.2. Matching algorithm
With 32 vectors at hand, we may impute 31 possible counterfactual states for each
treatment state a country-pair ij actually has in any year t, provided that there are
enough treated and control units available and that the scalar-valued balancing score
indeed balances the underlying observables. In order to determine comparable units
in ps-space, we have to impose a rule determining which units are comparable and
which are not. Commonly adopted procedures are M-nearest neighbor matching,
where the researcher ex ante determines the integer M but not the minimum tolerable
degree of similarity, and kernel matching, where the researcher ex ante determines the
minimum tolerable degree of similarity between treated and control units but not the
number of compared (matched) controls. So-called radius matching may be viewed as
a special case of kernel matching (with a fixed bandwidth and a uniform kernel). The
latter is what we employ, with a chosen radius of 0.01.27
In order to reduce the curse of dimensionality given the large possible treatment
status space and the potentially enormous demands on computing in order to ensure
balancing in an approach as in Dorn and Egger (2011), we implement estimation of
the average treatment effects of the treated (ATTs) as follows. First, radius matching
in a subsample of units with treatment status sijt or ~sijt and, hence, a propensity score
subvector for those two types of units only, say ps~s, obtains kernel weights for the treat-
ed (s) and the control observations (~s).28 These weights reflect which units are used for
comparison at all and which are not, and they reflect the number of times the same
control units are used for comparison (e.g. multiple use of control units leads to higher
26 Note that Nt in
PT
t¼1 Nt  1 acknowledges the fact that not all country-pairs are covered in all of the
46 years, so that the panel dataset is unbalanced. One reason for unbalancedness is that not all countries
of 2005 existed in all years covered. Another reason is that control variables are not available for all years
and country-pairs.
27 As usual, the form of the kernel tends to be less critical than the bandwidth. Ideally, one would select
the optimal bandwidth by a rule-of-thumb, a grid search, cross validation, or some other loss-function-
based approach to trade off precision and efficiency of the estimates. However, the dimensionality of the
problem requires us to cut short on this issue and choose a small-enough radius (bandwidth) heuristically.
28 Recall that we adopt radius matching with a radius of 0.01. For estimating, for example, the average
treatment effect on the treated of a GTA relative to a counterfactual with no PEIA at all, we compare
country-pairs with a GTA and propensity score sub-vector pss with units that actually got no-PEIA treat-
ment and had propensities for getting treatment of a GTA, ps~s , which fulfil jpss  ps~s j  0:01i, where ι is a
vector of ones of proper size.
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standard errors through the weighting). For ATTs in the year 2005, hs;~s2005,
29 we then
run weighted least squares. For this, we define an N2005 9 (K + 1) matrix Z2005. The
first column of Z2005 contains an indicator variable which is unity if pair ij has actual
treatment status sij,2005 and zero else, and the other columns of Z2005 contain the ele-
ments of xij,2005. Then, we define an N2005 9 N2005 matrix containing the weights
from radius matching, W2005. Finally, we obtain the ATT of treatment s relative to ~s,
hs;~s2005, as the first element of the (K + 1) 9 1 vector
^b ¼ ðZ02005W2005Z2005Þ1Z02005W2005ys2005;
where y
s
2005 is an N2005 9 1 outcome vector. Notice that conditioning on xij,2005 in
the estimation of ATT reduces the potential bias from a possible lack of balancing in
ps (see Blundell and Costa Dias, 2009).30
With panel data and switching into treatment of country-pair ij in an arbitrary year
t, we use the vector p
s
t for that pair to select control units in t with identical treatment
status ~s prior to treatment switching into status s in all years within the centred win-
dow around the treatment change. We match those control units in the year of the
treatment change and then estimate weighted least squares regressions using the
radius matching weights for all matched pairs with the same initial treatment state.
We do so for the most important (in terms of numbers of switching cases from
Table 2) treatment switches. The corresponding treatment effects may be labelled
h
s;~s
t , since they condition at least on part of the history of integration in the time neigh-
bourhood of treatment switching.31
APPENDIX B
GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM EFFECTS
In multi-country models of goods trade, services trade or foreign direct investment,
third-country effects of fundamentals arise naturally. Baier and Bergstrand (2009) pro-
vide a simple, linearized form of the effects of trade friction and trade facilitation vari-
ables in new trade theory models (for examples see Eaton and Kortum, 2002;
29 Notice that we speak now of hs;~s2005 rather than h
s;~s
2005 to emphasize that we do not condition the integra-
tion history explicitly here.
30 For estimates of long-run responses of outcome, we do not specify a time frame within which the
response has to take place. We can identify long-run responses which do not condition on the treatment
effect history from the cross-sectional variation in the data. There, the treatment status could principally
be acquired and the treatment effect be realized even before the sample period.
31 Short-run responses have to take place within a certain time frame after switching into a new treatment
status. With short-run responses, we condition on the treatment status history in the time neighbourhood
of switching. The latter implies that we can only analyse a subset of treatment effects, since case numbers
of changes are too small for most treatments (see Table 2).
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Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003). This paper focuses on the estimation of ATTs of
PEIAs (dubbed hs;~s in Appendix A). These treatment effects are asymmetric across
alternatives in the sense that hs;~s does not have to equal h~s;s. An average treatment
effect (ATE) which is symmetric in that sense was introduced as cs;~s in Appendix A. In
cross-section or panel data models, parameters on PEIA modes are commonly inter-
preted as estimates of cs;~s. Let us briefly outline how the direct ATE cs;~s (and, by a simi-
lar token, the direct ATT hs;~s ) relates to the total ATE (or ATT), which accounts for
general equilibrium effects. For this, it is useful to assume cross-sectional data so that
the time index can be dropped. Suppose we are interested in the effect of some gen-
eric PEIA indicator Tij for, say, GTA membership or STA membership. Furthermore,
let /i denote country i’s share of GDP in world GDP. Then, Baier and Bergstrand
(2009) suggest that OLS regressions could be based on log-transformed normalized
bilateral trade flows and transformed trade cost variables in order to render coeffi-
cients of trade costs consistent in spite of the presence of general equilibrium effects.
The transformed counterpart to Tij would be:
~Tij ¼ Tij 
XJ
i¼1
/iTij 
XJ
j¼1
/jTij þ
XJ
i¼1
XJ
j¼1
/i/jTij
where J denotes the number of countries in the world economy. The parameter on ~Tij
in an OLS regression with (GDP-normalized) log bilateral trade flows as the depend-
ent variable would then be a consistent estimate of the treatment effect cs;~s as a direct
effect. In this paper, we are interested in estimating direct effects of switching from Tij = 0
to Tij = 1 for country pair ij in the sense of h
s;~sðor cs;~s). Clearly, the total effect cum
general equilibrium repercussions of such a change for trade from country i to j
amounts to the respective treatment effect times
~TijðTij ¼ 1Þ  ~TijðTij ¼ 0Þ ¼ ð1 2/i  2/j þ 2/i/jÞ
Notice that the presence of (2/i2/j + 2/i/j) in that formula indicates that PEIA
treatments are symmetric so that i and j arise as an exporter and as an importer each.
A respective positive total effect of treatment Tij will be smaller than the direct effect
and depend on /i and /j. However, on average GDP shares /i are small so that
hs;~s and cs;~s will approximately measure direct as well as total effects unless very large
economies are at stake.
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